Interim Governments in Theory and Practice After Protracted Conflict by Guttieri, Karen
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2010-01-12
Interim Governments in Theory and
Practice After Protracted Conflict
Guttieri, Karen
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Civil Power in Irregular Conflict, Section 1, Chapter 3, pp. 51-56, January 12, 2010
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/36843
50 CIVIL POWER IN IRREGULAR CONFLICT 51
SECTION 1/CHAPTER 3
CHAPTER 3
Interim Governments in  
Theory and Practice After  
Protracted Conflict
By Professor Karen Guttieri




ics	of	authority	 transitions—ostensibly	an	 internal	 sovereign	concern—have	
become	an	international	preoccupation.	Practitioners	from	outside	war-torn	
societies	 broker	 constitutional	 arrangements,	 provide	military	 and	police	 to	
sustain	order	 and	enforce	 laws,	 and	 fashion	aid	programs	 in	order	 to	move	






















settle	a	 social	process:	 the	collective	determination	of	 the	 right	 to	 rule,	 also	
called	the	determination	of	legitimacy.	
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Piombo,	and	published	in	the	2008	volume,	Interim Governments as	follows: 
A Typology of Interim Government8
Revolutionary	regimes	enjoy	popularity,	but	have	little	connectivity	to	es-
tablished	structures	and	a	tendency	to	turn	violent	as	agendas	compete	and	







it	does,	creating,	as	 initially	 in	Bosnia,	an	awkward	administrative	 structure	
divided	along	civilian	and	military	lines	of	operations.	In	Kosovo,	the	author-
ity	structure	was	more	stable,	but	created	a	long-term	dependency.	









































































































Fully	 internationalized	 governments	 have	 difficulty	 extending	 powers,	
achieving	capacity	and	transparency,	and	are	ill-suited	to	address	disconnects	
between	the	elite	and	population.	Regional	neighbors	also	frequently	 influ-
ence	the	 interim	government.	The	consequence	 is	often	more	disconnected	
in	already	divided	societies.	A	study	in	Afghanistan	by	Tufts	University	found	
that	the	outsiders	and	insiders	differed	considerably	in	their	comprehension	of	
security	in	this	environment.	While	formally	the	transitional	political	process	
was	inclusive,	it	did	not	reach	out	to	the	everyday	lives	of	the	people.	“The	ex-
tent	of	disenfranchisement,”	Antonio	Donini	observes,	“is	proportional	to	the	
distance—geographical,	cultural,	or	political—from	the	capital.”14	It	 is	 ideal	
to	conduct	an	early	transfer	of	executive	authority,	with	step-by-step	reduc-
tions	in	scope	for	a	peacekeeping	mission.	Economic	control	may	be	slower	to	
regain	than	political	control.	
